The the product of three elements; Christianity, ancient Greek

The European
Union (EU) citizenship was first applied with the Maastricht Treaty. When we
look at it from its establishment until today, progress and integration are
always in the economic direction, and the EU’s efforts to integrate politically
still continue.

The first stage
is the Free Trade Zone. With this phase realized with the 1957 EEC, the removal
of the tariffs and tariffs aimed at is aimed at ensuring free movement. The
second stage is the Customs Union. Here, in addition to the first phase, a
common trade policy was aimed against third countries. Targets were reached in
the field of industry in 1968 and in agriculture in 1970. The third stage is
the Common Market. With the first two being valid, the free movement of a
common policy such as goods, services, people and capital is aimed. In the
fourth stage, the Economic and Monetary Union is located. The single currency
and monetary policy aimed at this was also realized. Finally, the fifth stage,
together with the Political Union, is not fully achieved in the common defense
and common foreign policy.

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The EU is in
the fifth stage, which has completed the fourth stage. When we look at the
goals that we have put into practice and realized up to now, we see that they
are all economically based. The problem of the EU, which is stranded in the
fifth stage, is legitimacy and identity. There are two views on EU identity.
The concept of Pan-nationalism based on classical culture and the other is the
understanding of post-nationalism based on flexible culture. In the classical
sense, we can define culture as a genetic code of a society, tradition, belief,
religious elements and symbols that are conveyed from the innermost circle.
Within this framework, European culture is the product of three elements;
Christianity, ancient Greek thought system and Roman law. The European
definition is shaped by the Roman law, which is supported with the Greek
culture, and the church acts as an umbrella. Later, the principles brought by the
Enlightenment were added slowly to this definition. Europe was now the most
advanced, the most civilized, and the civilized. Europe has been presented as a
model to the whole world.

Completion of
the fifth stage of the EU is important to ensure that it is common, one voice
is more effective in the international arena. The most serious alternative to
the identity of Europe may be the understanding of post-nationalism based on
flexible culture. As an integrated EU, democratic participation-based European citizenship
must be provided in order to be effective in the world. It is to create a
constitutional order based on a pluralistic identity that will enable the
religious groups to live together. Thus, it can be passed on to European
identity without giving up national identity. European identity is not
integrative and can not be based on conservative elements.

From the
perspective of political actors, the question now arises as to whether a
European identity is necessary for the further development of European
integration. If it is understood as a source of political support, and if this
public support is needed in democratic decision-making processes at the EU
level as the basis of legitimacy for political action, then European identity
is indispensable for future development. If it is to be sustainable and
reliable support for integration policy, then above all utilitarian identity is
necessary, which can be promoted by the fulfillment of expectations and
interests. The next question is whether and how strongly the citizens of Europe
are involved in the further development of the integration process, not only by
opinion polls but also through mechanisms of political participation, where
identification is the basis for decision-making.

In addition to
elections, referendums represent an immediate form of political participation
in the European Union.The ten new member states have voted by referendum on
joining the EU. In 13 of the 15 member countries so far, referendums are
constitutionally possible. Only in Germany and Italy there is no constitutional
basis for national referendums.As Table 2 (see PDF version) shows, the outcome
of a referendum is binding in six countries. In Denmark, for example, the
transfer of national sovereignty to transnational authorities must be confirmed
by a referendum if the parliament has not passed a majority of five-sixths. The
Irish constitution also calls for a referendum on the ratification of
international treaties.

In most of the
EU-15 Member States, the implementation of a referendum depends on the
initiative of institutional actors. Governments or parliaments are therefore in
a position to promote but also prevent the conduct of a referendum. Unlike the
ten acceding countries, no EU-15 government had initiated a referendum on the
political legitimacy of enlargement. This restraint may have ended with the
British Prime Minister’s opinion on the constitutional discussion. At the end
of April 2004, when Tony Blair said, “Then let the people have the final
say,” in many Western European countries, a vehement discussion took place
on the implementation of referenda on the ratification of the Constitution.The
vehemence with which the public and politics respond to this question shows
that the issue is moving into the center of credibility and legitimacy of the
political integration process. This means that it could become politically
impossible for citizens not to participate in European policy decisions –
regardless of how “dangerous” some governments consider it to be. In
this case, the strength and resilience of European identity achieved so far
will be decisive for the outcome of the referenda.

Whether
European identity in its emotional dimension is a reliable support for
integration policy is doubtful. Although the sense of togetherness is already
fairly stable among a part of the European population, the basis of affective
European identity is narrow. The affective identity is scarcely sufficient as
the basis of legitimacy for an integration policy that is accelerated in the
course of eastward enlargement. This raises the question of whether the feeling
of togetherness of Europeans can be politically promoted. As indicated, the
development of affective ties with the European Union is determined above all
by the length of the previous membership. Both are factors that can not be
influenced. Perhaps one can say with hope for the long-term trend: In the long
run we all will identify. However, the EU-15 Eurobarometer data have not shown
any upward trend. However, especially in the context of the current
constitutional debate, there is an opportunity to foster the solidarity of the
population with Europe by strengthening their responsibility for political
processes. The governments could, as Habermas says, “engage in a course of
risk-free and in any case time-consuming change of their current political
style and referendums, the citizens themselves participate in the process of
constitutionalization” and thus “the Constitution itself as a vehicle
for the training of a European Use identity “.This would strengthen the
emotional connection. However, the political actors are still reluctant to take
advantage of this opportunity.

The utilitarian
dimension of European identity is more clearly developed than the affective
one. The approval level is higher and is now showing a slight upward trend. In
support of European integration policy, this benevolent-minded EU agreement is
better suited than empathetic. The conclusion that political actors could
promote utilitarian identity in support of integration policies by serving the
cost-benefit calculations of the population is obvious. While not every Member
State can be a payee, national governments can direct utilitarian calculus to a
variety of topics where positive experiences of EU membership are possible. The
arguments range from structural and regional fund benefits, increasing freedom
of movement in the labor market and travel and services, to the benefits that
can be expected from opening borders, even at current burdens. In fact,
national governments are promoting their populations with the benefits that
their country derives from the EU. And what is more, they actively pursue this
in political practice and, at the same time, reject decisions and developments
deemed to be detrimental at EU level. The political focus on national benefits
always serves as a means to promote and sustain the consent and support of
populations. At the same time, the reference to the mood of one’s own people in
the negotiations at EU level can be used as a lever against the other member
states.

These
considerations can be summarized in two key points: Firstly: only utilitarian
motivated identification with Europe can be promoted and used in a proven
political logic. Second, national governments continue to follow this path.However,
this puts the political actors in a vicious circle. Since affective-based
identity can not be established in existing structures, they turn to
utilitarian identity. The development of European identity should be promoted
by serving the national and individual benefit-oriented calculi and thus buying
the support for the European project. Ongoing evidence of material benefits,
however, does little to stabilize utility-oriented identity, but strongly
disturbs emotional connectivity, ultimately promoting the opposite of what is
allegedly and perhaps actually supposed to be achieved, namely support for
integration policies backed by European identity. As long as national political
actors emphasize the satisfaction of national interests even in integration
projects such as the eastward enlargement, they cultivate national egoisms and
impede the formation of European solidarity. 26 The fact that the European
Community will associate “expediency judgments, but not value-related
identifications” with its obstructive nature for the future, is reinforced
by this policy.

 

Given the
likely cost of further integration, it is becoming increasingly risky to rely
politically on calculated pay as the prevailing interpretation of benefits and
costs will make it harder to provide national benefits, especially if they
manifest later. If the impression on the population increases that the EU’s
policy costs above all else, it can be expected that identification with the
European project will decline in its emotional and benefit-oriented dimension.